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Kripke’s Category Error: Why There Are No Necessary A Posteriori Propositions 
 
This appears in chapter 8 and appendix 3 of Peter Ulric Tse’s “The Neural Basis of Free 
Will: Criterial Causation” (MIT Press, 2013). 
 
The most serious attack on a descriptivist account of reference was Kripke’s (1980) 
argument that reference arises only via a causal link between a proper name and the thing 
it refers to. He starts with an intuition showing, he argues, that descriptivism is incorrect: If 
a famous person had died as a baby, all the descriptions that defined his or her fame as an 
adult would not apply to the baby; but we would nonetheless want to consider him or her 
the same person regardless of our descriptions. Kripke argues that a proper name (e.g., 
“Alexander the Great”) is therefore a “rigid designator,” which means that it refers to the 
named person or thing in every possible (i.e., conceivable, but not necessarily actually 
existing) world in which it “exists.” In contrast, most descriptions (e.g., “the leader who 
defeated Darius III and conquered Persia”) are not rigid in that they can refer to different 
referents in different possible worlds. For example, in another possible world, Alexander’s 
father is the one to have defeated Darius III and conquered Persia. A criterialist would say 
that the criterion “defeated Darius III” would be satisfied only by the mental representation 
of the adult Alexander, and not by the representation of the baby, and that criterial 
satisfaction need not depend in any necessary way on Alexander the Great’s ever having 
even existed. That criterion could be satisfied in the context of a comic book by the story’s 
hero. In the real world, it is satisfied by Alexander the Great. 
 
Let us define some needed philosophical terms. A necessarily true proposition is 
conventionally defined as a proposition that could not have been false. A contingently true 
proposition is defined as one that is true but might have been false. A priori knowledge is 
true by definition and does not require experience to prove it, whereas a posteriori 
knowledge can only be gained via experience or empirical evidence. Kripke’s argument 
against a descriptivist account of reference and his claim that there are necessary a 
posteriori truths results from a category error that arises because of an ambiguity within 
the symbolism of modal logic that carries over from the ambiguity of ordinary languages 
from which that symbolism derives. The nature of the category error was first pointed out 
by Quine (1943, 1960, 1961, 1966). He noted that the central expressions in modal logic 
are “necessarily” and “possibly,” and that modal logic uses these expressions in a 
referentially opaque manner, undermining their ability to derive true statements. As an 
example he gives: (1) The number of planets = 9; (2) necessarily (9 > 7); substituting from 
(1) into (2) yields (3) necessarily (the number of the planets > 7). This false conclusion 
occurs because substitution is allowed only in cases where reference is direct (Frege’s term 
was ‘gerade’), as when different names refer to the same thing in the world. Substitution is 
not allowed when reference is opaque (ungerade), as occurs, for example, when terms refer 
to others’ mental states, including what they may believe or know. 
 
Stalnaker (1976, 2004) and Chalmers (1996, ch. 2, section 4; 2002, 2005, 2006; but see 
Soames, 2007, for a defense of Kripke) have recently argued against Kripke in the spirit of 
Quine’s “argument from propositional ambiguity,” and pushed for a revival of 
descriptivism. According to their “two-dimensional semantic analysis,” a sentence like 
“water is H2O” expresses two propositions: The primary intension of “water” might be a set 
of descriptions that water meets (e.g., clear, drinkable, freezes at zero degrees); the 
secondary intension of water is whatever it is in this world that satisfies these descriptions. 
Since H2O satisfies these descriptions in our world, “water” in this second sense must refer 
to H2O in all possible worlds, because H2O is H2O in all worlds. The primary intension is a 
posteriori (and not necessary, since it is only contingently the case that “water” picks out 
H2O in our world), and the second intension is necessary (and not a posteriori, because a 
thing, like H2O, is necessarily identical to itself in all possible worlds). Kripke only 
concluded that there are necessary a posteriori propositions because a single sentence can 
frame two propositions at the same time. 
 
 
I will continue Quine’s, Stalnaker’s, and Chalmers’s line of attack using the “argument from 
propositional ambiguity.” While related, my argument is that a single sentence can frame a 
proposition about a thing-in- itself and also frame a proposition about a mental construct of 
that thing. To make this clear, two things can be mentally identical or not, or noumenally 
(actually) identical or not. This gives rise to a 2×2 with four cells. An example of “mentally 
identical and actually identical” would be the morning star and evening star after it was 
discovered and mentally modeled that both are in fact Venus. An example of “mentally 
different but actually identical” would be the same, but before this discovery, where the 
two stars were thought to be different stars, but were in fact both Venus. An example of 
“mentally the same and actually different” would be two species that we mistakenly think 
are one species, such as bonobos and chimpanzees were initially thought to be, but which 
in fact are different species. An example of “mentally different and actually different” would 
be how we think about these two separate species today. 
 
On a criterialist account, necessary a posteriori truths are not allowed. Like ordinary 
English, the symbolism of modal logic  makes no distinction between propositions about 
(1) reality-in-itself (i.e., the “noumenal” world, independent of any perceptions of it) and 
(2) a perceiver’s perceptual and cognitive maps or models of reality-in-itself derived from 
“phenomenal” experience and the preconditions of that experience. (It is understandable 
that these two types of propositions are conflated, because we cannot in fact formulate 
verifiably true propositions about reality-in-itself, because arguably we have no direct 
access to it (Kant, 1998 [1781]); we only have (2), our perceptual and cognitive maps of it. 
Nonetheless, we commonly form propositions about things that we cannot access or 
experience, whether other people’s experiences or the noumenal world, by inferring what 
must be the case given our experience). . In ordinary human languages, no distinction is 
made between propositions of type (1) and (2). If I say “I see a child” or “A child is standing 
right over there” I mean both (1) that there is a child out there in the world independent of 
my perception of it, and (2) I have a mental/perceptual model that there is a child out 
there.  
 
Kripke’s usage of modal logic similarly conflates propositions of types (1) and (2). Kripke’s 
favorite examples of necessary a posteriori truths are “water is H2O” and “Hesperus (the 
morning star) is identical with Phosphorus (the evening star).” Using this second example, 
at some point it was empirically discovered that both stars were in fact the planet Venus. 
Although they were once thought to be two stars, they were discovered to be in fact one 
and the same thing. It is essential to realize that “Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus” 
can frame two distinct propositions, one of type (1) and one of type (2). These are: (1) The 
noumenal thing-in-itself labeled “Hesperus” is identical in reality-in-itself with the thing-in-
itself labeled by “Phosphorus” and (2) the mental model of the thing-in-itself labeled 
“Hesperus” and the mental model of the thing-in-itself labeled “Phosphorus” are identical 
mental models. However, that my mental models should be such that the morning and 
evening star are both modeled as Venus followed the empirical discovery that they were 
both Venus. The type (2) proposition here must be contingent. However, the above type (1) 
proposition is necessary if it is true, because a thing-in-itself is necessarily identical with 
itself, even if it is given two different names. It is only because of the ambiguity introduced 
by the fact that a single sentence can frame two different propositions, one necessary (1) 
and the other a posteriori (2), that one reaches the mistaken conclusion that there can be 
necessary a posteriori truths. However, we must consider the two different propositions 
(1) and (2) separately. A given proposition is either necessary and a priori or contingent 
and a posteriori. It cannot be both. The end result of Stalnaker’s, Chalmers’s, or my 
argument ends the same way, however: against Kripke and in support of descriptivism. 
Those interested in reading a formal version of the “argument from propositional 
ambiguity” in terms of modal logic can find one below: 
 
The modal logical proof forming the backbone of the argument that led Kripke (1980) to 
claim the existence of necessary a posteriori propositions can be rewritten in a way that 
disambiguates the ambiguity between propositions of type (1) and (2). 
 
The original proof, due to Barcan (1946), has four steps, {A}–{D}: 
 
{A} (x)(y)[(x=y)⊃(Px⊃Py)] (read: For any objects x and y such that x is identical with y, if x 
has a given property P, y also has this property); 
 
{B} (x)□(x=x) (read: For any object x, x is necessarily identical with x); 
 
{C} (x)(y)(x=y)⊃[□(x=x)⊃□(x=y)] (read: For any objects x and y such that x is identical 
with y, letting P be the property of being necessarily identical with x, we see, applying {A}, 
that if x has this property, y has it too; According to {B}, however, x has the property of 
necessarily being identical to x); 
 
{D} (x)(y)((x=y)⊃□(x=y)) (read: Therefore, for any objects x and y such that x is identical 
with y, y is necessarily identical with x. 
 
However, if the second equal sign in {D} is taken to stand for an identity between (type 2) 
mental models of things-in-themselves and the first equal sign in {D} is taken to stand for 
an identity between (type 1) things-in-themselves in reality-in-itself, we will be violating 
the rules of logic, because the equal signs stand for different equalities. From such a 
confusion, we can draw no true conclusions. It is precisely this mistake, due to an 
ambiguity in the formalism inherited from ordinary language, that led Kripke to the wrong 
conclusion that there are necessary a posteriori truths. To make this point more explicitly, 
let the subscript 1 mean that we are talking about things-in-themselves. On this account 
“x1” means thing-in=itself  x1 and “=1” means “identical in reality in-itself” or “noumenally 
identical.” Let subscript 2 mean that we are talking about mental models or percepts of 
things-in-themselves. Then “x2” means mental model x2 or experience x2, and “=2” means 
“identical in the mind” or “phenomenally identical.” Substituting propositional type (1) into 
the Barcan proof, we end up with: 
 
{D1} (x1)(y1)((x1=1y1)⊃□(x1=1y1)) (read: For any things-in-themselves x1 and y1, such that 
x1 is noumenally identical with y1, y1 is necessarily noumenally identical with x1; In other 
words, a thing-in-itself is, not surprisingly, necessarily identical with itself). 
 
Substituting propositional type (2) into the Barcan proof, we end up with: 
 
{D2} (x2)(y2)((x2=2y2)⊃□(x2=2y2)) (read: For any mental models or experiences x2 and y2, 
such that x2 is identical with y2 in someone’s mind, y2 is necessarily identical with x2 in that 
mind; In other words, a mental model or experience is, not surprisingly, necessarily 
identical with itself. 
 
How then did Kripke reach the astounding result that an identity of two mental models, 
which everyone grants is an a posteriori identification, is also a necessary identity if it is 
true? He did so by conflating propositions of type (1) and (2). There is, to my knowledge, 
no logical way to prove: 
 
{D3} (x1)(y1)(x2)(y2) ((x1=1y1)⊃□(x2=2y2)) (read: For any things-in-themselves x1 and y1 
and mental constructs x2 and y2 such that x1 is noumenally identical in reality-in-itself with 
y1, it is necessary that the mental construct x2 is phenomenally identical with the mental 
construct y2). 
 
That people once thought the morning star and evening star were different shows that {D3} 
is wrong. 
 
And to my knowledge there is also no logical way to prove: 
 
{D4} (x1)(y1)(x2)(y2) ((x2=2y2)⊃□(x1=1y1)) (read: For any things-in-themselves x1 and y1 
and mental constructs x2 and y2 such that x2 is mentally identical with y2, it is necessary 
that the thing-in-itself x1 is noumenally identical with the thing-in-itself y2). 
 
{D4} is what Kripke claimed, and it is false, and follows from the Barcan proof only because 
of a category error between propositions of type (1) and (2). 
 
Kripke claimed, on the basis of this interpretation of the Barcan proof, that if the 
identification of the thing-in-itself called “a mental state” with the thing-in-itself called “a 
brain state” is a true identification, it is necessarily true. And since, he argues, mind–brain 
identity theorists admit that this identity is contingent—which, on his account, it cannot 
be—the identity is not true at all, but false (cf. similar arguments by Chalmers, 1996, pp. 
146–149). Since, however, Kripke’s criticism of identity theory rests on a conflation of 
propositional categories that should be kept distinct, his argument does not in fact rule out 
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